[Editor’s Note:] A draft version of this paper was presented at the first conference of the International Society for Philosophy and Psychotherapy held at the Las Vegas Riviera Hotel October 11, 1986. The penetrative, in-depth treatment of "cosmic harmony" and "process of harmonization" proves most appropriate for this Journal.

In this essay I want to develop the theme of a Chinese philosophical legacy in Dogen’s thought. At the outset I wish to emphasize that philosophical debts, unlike economic ones, do not deplete the richness of one’s thought, nor do they diminish one’s uniqueness—this is especially true for Dogen (1200-1253). To point out the Japanese, Buddhist and Chinese philosophical influences on Dogen’s thought does not detract from his originality; rather it clarifies that uniqueness by illuminating the background. In this essay I will explicate the Chinese philosophical background behind Dogen’s concept of "self," and then elaborate some of the complexities of his conception. I will focus on the enlightened or consummate self, especially "self" as it is expressed by Dogen in the phrase jijuyu sanmai (ch. tzu-shou-yung san-mai), the spontaneous self receiving and applying samadhi, enlightenment.

The project is threefold. I begin by discussing the problem of "self" especially as it has impacted on the mind-body problem. Then, I briefly outline a shared organic concept of self found in early Chinese Confucian and Taoist thought which sponsors Dogen’s view. Finally, I explicate the Buddhist, especially Dogen’s, view on the self. Comparisons and contrasts are noted throughout. In an indirect manner this study will provide further insight into the influences of Chinese thought on Ch’an/Zen Buddhism.

What is the self? Is it an immutable substance, forming the core of consciousness, maintaining its identity even when separated from the body (dualism); or is it nothing more than the chemical processes of the body (materialism); or is it something else entirely, like Spinoza’s double-aspect? Could the self be the very spiritual creative ground of life? The problem of self is more commonly addressed as the mind-body problem and has bearing on the problem of personal identity and the problem of other minds. These "problems" arise out of and fall back on certain epistemological and linguistic problems, such as self knowledge, and seeking the meaning of so-called mentalistic propositions like "I feel a headache coming on," or "I know that . . . ." The superstructure of the mind-body and personal identity problems rests on epistemological foundations. For Plato, the mind existed before and after residing within the body; without its disembodied state the mind could not know the ideal forms, learning to remember them in this life time. Plato’s "two world theory," as Nietzsche called it, generates a mind-body dichotomy. The contemporary linguistic frame for the discussion of these problems is a response to Descartes’s epistemology. His methods of doubt and inquiry led him to claim that at least some mentalistic statements, namely the coqito, are the only indubitable propositions. Descartes, like Plato, constructed a two world theory to accommodate his epistemology. The problems with the dualistic models are clear and simple; namely, once one has dichotomized the mind from the body, one has the problem of explaining how they fit together in one’s life. Hence, the development of the rather shaky positions of interactionism, occasionalism, and parallel-ism; each attempting to justify a dualistic conception. the traditional alternative is to deny the dualism and advance some form of monism. Extreme materialism and identity theory are not only reductionistic and mechanistic, but they do not jive with lived-experience either. LIkewise at the other end of the monism spectrum, radical idealism, like that of Berkeley, is also unattractive because of its extreme rejection of the body as mere illusion. Thomé Fang has reviewed some of the shortcomings of the dualistic conceptions of humanity which he proposes "... rend man in pieces."[1]

Moreover, the dualistic and monistic models sponsor some form of substantialistic self. Of course, Hume and the Buddha provide important alternatives.[2] At the risk of overgeneralization, one might claim that the Hume and Buddhist notions of "self" are non-substantialistic; where the "self" is not reducible to one reality, nor one material process, nor is it fully distinguishable from the body. It is all of these psychophysical processes in conjunction with environmental factors which manifest the complex bundle-self. There is an important difference here in that Buddhism goes so far as to propose that the bundle-self (the five skandhas) is no-self (anātman). Hume was not so radical, and at times like with his "stage" metaphor, one gets the impression of an underlying (Anglo-Germanic) selbs (self).[3] Furthermore, Hume’s position that both mind and body are bundles of "perceptions" promotes a form of neutral and monism; whereas Buddhism holds a non-dual position purged of substantialism. A non-substantialistic conception of self, as we shall see, integrates mind and body, self and other through activity, and it dissolves the problem of personal identity by rooting the identity of one’s self in one’s present action.

What I am calling the non-substantialistic model of the Buddha and Hume, that is, the multidimensional interrelated bundle-self, must be sharply distinguished from other more common pluralistic models. For example, a more challenging typification of major Western philosophers, like Plato and Descartes, would be to see their positions on mind and body not as dualistic, but rather as pluralistic such that it is not a simple mind/body or soul/body dualism which typifies their thought, but at least a tripartite division of animal-life-force, affective-emotive faculties, and the rational-cognitive faculties. Even with this more sophisticated tripartite pluralism, which is apparent from Plato to Freud, there is, however, a clear essentialism which is absent in the Buddha and most of Hume.[4] Moreover, typifying the tripartite pluralism as a dualism is not entirely an oversimplification because the animal-life-forces, and the emotive faculties are usually considered to be bodily, contingent, and accidental; while the rational aspect, the mind or soul, was allegedly independent, unextended, and as the copure of one’s being, it was considered the true "essential" self—the true self is usually hidden and/or fractured and must be re-discovered or reunified. It is this quality of an "essential" self which is absent in the non-substantialistic model of self found in Hume’s psychology, Buddhism, and, as we shall see, in Chinese thought and Ch’an/Zen as well.[5] So when I speak of a non-substantialistic mode of self I intend to summon up images of a non-essentialistic, complex "self" without a core or pre-given nature.[6]

The Chinese concept of "self" (tzu), for the most part, fits this non-essentialistic model of "self," and it contrasts nicely with the dualistic model. Naturally this Chinese version of the non-substantialistic self-differs from the Hume and the Buddhist views. Hume’s approach is still very psychological; the self is a bundle of perceptions; for the Chinese, the inner psychological states are not the locus of self or personhood. It is the external socio-spiritual and environmental context in which the process of self is developed. "Self," in the Chinese context then, cannot be reduced to a substance or mechanism; it is developed in the process and context of one’s life. Although the basic organic cosmology common to both Confucian and Taoist schools of thought affirms a negative aspect (yin or wu), nevertheless the Chinese negativity is not as radical as the Buddhist śūnyata. For the Buddhist, especially the Mahayana Buddhists, nothingness is not merely the opposite of something/-existence; it is the groundless-ground which contains both nothing-ness and existence. For the Chinese, nothingness and existence are interlocked in the harmonious process of generation and decay, of change and transformation.[7] Thus, the Buddhists hold that the true self is no-self (anātman); whereas the Chinese see self in a more positive frame as an achievement of disclosing one’s self, or actualizing one’s natural propensities (tzu hsing), or one’s self-so-ness (tzu jan), or one’s self-integration with tao (tzu te).[8] For the Chinese, "self" is an achievement concept.[9] By achievement I do not mean a simple means to an end nor a potential/actual type teleology; rather by "achievement" I mean the lived-experience of integrating with an ongoing process of transforming, altering, developing and decaying, unique particulars. For example, the Confucians, "self" is achieved through sociopolitical integration; for the Taoists, it is achieved through cosmic integration. In the Chinese context "self" is not an underlying substance of the individual; it is what one is becoming in relation to all others within one’s environment. there is no dualistic subject/object distinction, nor do the Chinese propose a monism; it is a di-polar interpenetration of each into every other. Thus, "self" is disclosed environmentally, for the Confucians and the Taoists alike would accept that the full disclosure of self, like that of the sage, is primarily defined by its achievement, its integration, of both social and cosmic harmony.

Thomé Fang has also described the Chinese conception of selfhood as a developmental realization, an achievement within the creative process of nature.

A thorough understanding of the complete potency of human mind from its initial incentive to knowledge up to its final achievement of spiritual eminence will enable a man to do anything that he ought to do in the spirit of loving consciousness of kind—especially of humankind . . . . His conduct of life with a view to achieving significance and the value will be in unison with the cosmic rhythm of creativity . . . . He will eventually become a sage or saint, realizing in his own person the sacredness of life . . . .

In the very process of living in concord with creative Nature, Man is charged with an ideal to be fully realized in the light of . . . comprehensive harmony.[10]

Analytically speaking, the Chinese conception of "self" has three dimensions. First, there is the desire-centered organism which the Fa chia (conventionally translated Legalist, but more appropriately rendered Systematizers) attempt to restrain by reward and punishment, but many of the other classical Chinese thinkers, especially the Confucians and Taoists, attempt to overcome. For example, the Analects speaks of "overcoming the petty self" (k’o chi),[11] or the Chuang tzu tells us to practice "self-forgetting" and "purifying the heart-mind."[12] Second, there is the social self which was stressed by the Confucians’ where one’s self disclosure is defined in the context of one’s socio-spiritual actions. Third, there is the cosmic dimension of self; where one’s full self disclosure is not interpreted in human terms—one fully expresses one’s own unique becoming through creative spontaneous action. In this sense, "self" is one’s natural spontaneous fulfillment and disclosure within one’s environment. Who one is is never a finished product but a continuous process of transformation in which one is appropriating one’s context to oneself and integrating oneself to one’s context. Thus, both part and whole, or field and focus, are fully integrating. The whole is never greater than the sum of its parts as in the Western organic model; rather the focus, part, or self in this case, is co-determinant with all other foci within its field or whole context. This interpenetration and integration of self and the whole of existence or the myriad things, as the Chinese prefer, is expressed by both Mencius and Chuang Tzu:

This unity in diversity and interpenetration of nature and oneself gave rise to the popular expression "nature and humanity are harmonized together" (t’ien jen ho yi), and it is the basis of Chinese spirituality and nature-mysticism.[13] This fundamental organic dynamic unity of field and focus is a common ground for both Confucian and Taoist thought, but there is an important difference of emphasis which clearly distinguishes their respective positions.

These three models of "self" represent the basic tendencies of the Fa chia, Confucians, and Taoists. For the most part the Fa chia writers concenive of self as the basic desire-centered selfish organism. This is clearly seen in the Fa chia texts, especially Han fei tzu where one of the most common admonitions is for the ruler to be wary of his ministers because they will attempt to take advantage of the ruler’s power for their own selfish benefit. At best this desire-centered self can only be suppressed and controlled, and this is the basic skill of the ruler, that is controlling and directing the desire-centered masses. Of course this is done by encouraging farming and warfare.

At least, for Hsün tzu, depraved human character can be socialized through discipline, primarily performance of ritual action (li) and study (hsüeh), one can develop a higher socio-spiritual self. Mencius held that this higher socio-spiritual self or character was inherent in humanity but must be cultivated for full expression. The true self, for Mencius, is the full disclosure of one’s natural socio-spiritual propensities—one’s good character (shan hsing). Some other Confucian works stress the cosmic dimension or the extension of the socio-spiritual virtues to nature and animals. For example, the Chung yung (Doctrine of the Mean), Tung Chung-shu’s Ch’un-ch’iu fan-lu, and many Neo-Confucian works extend such socio-spiritual virtues as authentic-sincerity (ch’eng) and reverence (ching) into cosmic forces. Whereas the Fa chia position on "self" was basically a desire-centered theory; the Confucian position is strongly anthropocentric. The Confucians are locked into an anthropocentric world view. The unity of nature and humanity is understood in human terms; it is an antropo-cosmic-centric unity. The Taoist seeks to step around these desire-centered and anthropocentric realms; or rather, perhaps, the Taoist seeks never to step within them.

In this sense the Taoist perspective is trans-human or non-anthro-pocentric; Taoists seek unity with nature in terms of their own lived-bodily manifestation of nature itself. For the Taoist, this "nature itself" is not an objective nature which stands apart form human nature; this is nature in its organic process of fully interpenetrating and interdependent particulars. It is nature as the field of one’s subjective placement. There is not dualism here; no subject/object or culture/nature or natural/unnatural dichotomy. There is a full interpenetration of one’s self with all of the myriad things. The full disclosure of oneself is the further opening up of the cosmos. For the Taoist, this self disclosure as world disclosure is expressed in their concept of spontaneous self-so-ing (tzu jan). Tzu jan is the very model of tao (Lao tzu, 25), and yet it is what each and everything is of and by its own nature (Lao tzu), 64). It must be kept in mind that for the Chinese world view the self is not a preestablished hidden essence or fixed potentiality; rather self is always expressed through one’s activity and behavior within the context of either the Confucian socio-spiritual world or the Taoist natural environment. Thus, the expression of one’s true self is an expression of the very subjective nature of the myriad things and their complete interpenetration. Each part discloses each and every other part and their interrelations, the field, all at once. It is an environmentally developed and integrated self. Aside from the Fa chia writers who put the "self" in the basic animal desires, the general Chinese concept of "self" is placed within one’s contextual activity. For Confucians, "self" is achieved in one’s propitious deportment within the socio-spiritual context; for the Taoists, the process of "self" is disclosed when one is acting in accord with tao, that is acting creatively and spontaneously as part and parcel of the natural environment. What concerned the Chinese, generally speaking, was achieving a contextually realized self, and transmitting something of this integration to others. Thus, the Chinese developed the problem of "transmission," rather than a mind-body problem. Consciousness (hsin, the heart mind) is displayed in what one does (shen, body-behavior) rather than thinking (ssu), and so awareness of other minds is no problem, for the Chinese, since they are also disclosed through their appropriation of context. The classical Chinese thinkers developed a cosmology concerned with change (yi) and transformation (hua), and their cosmology can be used to dissolve the problem of personal identity by overriding the concern for maintaining unchanging identity over time—they celebrate the transformations and seek integrity in context, not identity.

Dogen’s discussion of "self" is couched in Buddhist terms. Therefore, it is in order that I briefly review the Buddhist position on "self" (anª tman).[14] The Buddha was well acquainted with dualistic, and monistic theories of the self, and he rejected them. The Buddha basically sought to dispel any illusion and/or delusion generated by desire-centered cravings for life and pleasure; he sought to side-step any objectified, reified conception of self. Thus, he proposed the stance of anātman, no-self. But this no-self is not a nihilism or a mere denial of self; rather it is an enlightenment discovery of one’s true self nature which is no-nature. Expressed negatively it is called anatman; positively it is the pañca-skandhas, the five threads, viz, corporeality (rupa), feeling or sensation (vendana), perception (samjñā), volitional dispositions or impressions (samskaras—all the impulses, emotions, memories associated with past experiences which influence present and future expreience), and consciousness or intelligence (vijñāna).[15] However, even the skandhas are without any self nature or essence. The skandhas, like any other dharma (thing), are impermanent (anitya) and interdependent co-arising (pratitya-samutpāda). This interdependent co-arising is strikingly similar to the Chinese notion of interpenetration, and the Hua Yen (J. Kegon, Golden Flower, or Flowery Splendor) school of Chinese Buddhism did the most to unite these two views. For the Buddhist, the examination of the self leads to the discovery that the self is not the self, and thus the true self is realized and neither a positive self nor a negative self. The Buddha was side-stepping the metaphysical question of "self," and attempting to free us from the desire-centered conceptualization of a substantial core to our existence because any concept of "self," for example spiritual, monistic, or dualistic, will only generate desire-attachment, clinging and further suffering (dukkha). The true self or enlightened person in Buddhism is an achievement-in-process concept; the "self" is not an ontological given. One’s self or one’s person must be achieved or created through one’s enlightenment expreience—the enlightenment-self or Buddha-nature—otherwise one lives with a deluded conception of self. This "achievement" is not based on a means-ends teleology; from the unenlightened perspective there appears to be a developmental process of moving out of ignorance (avidyā) and in nirvana. From the enlightened perspective, however, enlightenment itself is also interdependent co-arising with all other things for all time, and so enlightenment is an achievementless achievement.

With the spread of Mahāyāna Buddhism to China, the early Buddhist emphasis on the analysis of states of consciousness achieved in meditation and the anātman position gave way to a more positive expression of enlightened "self" or "person." This is seen in the Ch’an/Zen expression of "seeing one’s inner-nature" (chien hsing). This more positive expression of self an nirvana is characteristic of Mahāyāna Buddhism’s shift of emphasis, but it especially flourished in China where there was already a positive expression of self which was understood to be based on a negation of the petty desire-centered self; at least, this was the case for many Confucian and Taoist thinkers.

The concept of "self" in its full richness as the enlightened-self, the sustained realization of the impermanence-self, Buddha-nature, or the very impermanence of life, is fundamental in Dogen’s thought. Dogen’s concept of self permeates his work. It is crucial in such introductory pieces as "Bendowa" and "Genjokoan," and as Tamaki Koshiro points out, Dogen’s concept of self, especially as jijuyu-sanmai, is expressed in or underlies at least sixteen other chapters of Shobogenzo which deals with such topics as enlightenment, the Buddha’s light, aspects of nature, and religious devotion.[16] It is also at the core of his discussion on Buddha-nature.[17] The concept of self plays an important role in Dogen’s thought because it is the locus of Buddha-nature manifested in the body’s (devotional) activities, especially those of practice. This unity of one’s self and one’s actions as a buddha are clearly contained in Dogen’s well known admonition to shikan taza, or attainment only by sitting meditation, or themeless zazeni. As Dogen said in the "Zuimonki:"[18]

Again one cannot that the emphasis is placed on what one does, especially with one’s body-behavior, rather than on what one thinks. Generally speaking, for Dogen, "self" is achieved by appropriating behavior and context. Dogen’s thought can be typified as a series of bipolar interpenetrations, for instance the unity of practice and attainment, the unity of time and buddha-nature, the unity of impermanence and buddha-nature, and the unity of self and buddha-nature. And so the bipolar interpenetrations of the teachings of Buddhism and self:[19]

The key concept to be learned is to be forgotten. As one might put it concerning the initiate, this is the lesson of (psychologically) remembering to (ontologically) forget—not merely psychological forgetting, but ontological forgetting of the human centered view. This forgetting of the self fits nicely with the Buddhist and the Chinese, especially the Taoist, background to Dogen’s thought. As was noted above, generally speaking, both the Buddhist and Chinese traditions seek to overcome the desire-centered self to plunge into the depths of one’s natural existence. This radical self-forgetting is nicely portrayed in the Lieh tzu story of the man from Sung who "lost his memory;" he not only forgot his self; he also forgot his very humanness.[20] Likewise for Dogen, one must overcome the desire-centered self, even the human-centered self, and recognize the complete interpenetration of self and world. In a sense Dogen wants to penetrate subjectivity to its fullest, to the very depths of intersubjectivity, the very spontaneous natural ground of existence. As he says in the "Genjokoan:"[21]

Here we see that Dogen is not after a relative subjectivity where each self reaches out and confirms reality, but rather Dogen seeks the very existential ground of one’s being. This is the natural environment which comes forward to define us. Dogen has gone beyond subjectivity, subjective thinking. He has penetrated to the depths of human life, by transcending the desire-centered and anthropocentered perspectives. This "transcendence" is not one sided or dualistic, nor is it a simple oneness of identity. It is a turning from the human-centered world to the nature-centered world and back. As Dogen stated in the Gakudoyojinshu:"[22]

For Dogen there is a double transcendence or more appropriately a double negation, that is, after transcending the self, one must transcend that transcendence, or after negating the self, one must negate the negation. As Dogen put it in "Genjokoan:" "Again there are men who gain enlightenment beyond enlightenment." [23]

This notion of gaining "enlightenment beyond enlightenment" is the full turning away from objective thinking and mere subjective thinking. It is similar to Dogen’s notion of " . . . going beyond Buddha . . .," that is not abiding in buddhahood but also transcending it.[24] In other words if one attains enlightenment and one acknowledges that enlightenment is other than delusion, one is still locked into a world of representational thinking—whether it be objective or subjective representational thinking. That is, one has not real-ized and integrated the full interpenetration of each into every other; one is still locked into some form of an antropocentered world where the self is distinguished and separated from the other.

To appreciate that the self/other and the practice/attainment unity are central to Dogen’s position, we can cite again the passage on "learning the self" to give its full context; the passage runs as follows:[25]

In this passage we begin to see the ontological and methodological unity in Dogen’s thought—the approach takes and his ontological position are complementary. From the place of traceless enlightenment, what one is and what one does are inseparable expressions of the Buddha Way. In the above quote four points are brought out. First, there is the overcoming of the petty desire-centered self. Second, this overcoming is affected by a turning of the self away from things, and allowing things to confirm oneself. In this sense the self is defined in terms of its co-dependent environment. Nishida had a similar idea: "Things come to and illuminate us."[26] Third, and most important for Dogen’s expression of the Boddhisattva ideal, when all things confirm the self, there is a radical enlightenment experience in which one’s own enlightenment affects the enlightenment of all others. Or as Dogen put it: "To be confirmed by all things is to effect the casting off of one’s own body-mind and the bodies-and-minds of others." Fourth, this enlightenment experience of casting off body-mind is comprehensive or radical in that one comes full turn in the enlightenment of enlightenment or the negation of enlightenment such that all recognition of a state of enlightenment different from every-day-life is dispelled. As the old Zenadage says: "The everyday mind is the enlightened mind." This can be seen in Abe’s and Waddell’s comment on the above passage concerning "casting off the body-mind:"[27]

For Dogen, then, the self is fundamentally united with the Buddha Dharma—to find one is to find the other. This is made clear in the following passage from "Genjokoan:"[28]

In this passage we see that the self and Dharma cannot be separated; they are part and parcel of each other. It is a delusion to think that they are separate, and thus, when one attempts to seek for the Dharma as something else outside of one’s own self, then one becomes removed from one’s environs. It is only when one dies not seek the Dharma outside one’s self, when one does not seek the Dharma at all—since it must be transmitted by an authentic master—that one realizes one’s true nature to be the Dharma nature and vice versa. To put it simply, the enlightened self is one other than the enlightened realization of the desire-centered selfish cravings. Furthermore, this transmission is not the "giving" of something from one person to another; rather it is one’s full realization of one’s own self. Abe and Waddell cite Dogen to confirm this point in their commentary to the above passage:[29]

For Dogen, one must overcome the desire-centric perspective and all forms of dualistic and representational thinking in order to realize one’s true self. This comprehensive interpenetration of each into every other and of each into all and all in one is further elaborated in Dogen’s essay on Buddha-nature.

In the Buddha-nature essay Dogen argues against the common dualistic and representational interpretations of Buddha-nature. His basic premise is that: "Whole being is the Buddha-nature."[30] Further more, Dogen proposes that ". . . one integral entity of whole being (is) ‘sentient beings.’"[31] However, Dogen would warn us against dichotomizing between the whole and the parts. For Dogen, as for Buddhism in general, the whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. Thus Dogen concludes: "When things are thus (whole being is Buddha-nature), both within and without (self and environment) sentient beings is in itself the whole being of the Buddha-nature."[32] Dogen goes on to point out that one must avoid the conventional dualistic and representational modes of thinking and living. As he emphasizes in the following:[33]

This is a nondual view of the Buddha-nature which is based on Dogen’s enlightenment experience. Since the enlightenment experience gives one insight into a trans-representational view of reality, Dogen naturally rejects all dualistic and objective perspectives. This is a radical nondual vantage point. Dogen’s perspective is so radical that if hard pushed it would appear that the expression "self is an environmental locus" is misleading, because it still sounds as though there is a "self" which can be separated from an "environment." Such a dualistic model is not what I have in mind; rather I propose that, for understanding Dogen, the expression "self is an environmental locus" is an attempt to overcome that very dualism. "Self" should not be understood as some hidden spiritual inner reality separate from its environment; rather self is the environment—it is not just another part making up a greater whole—it and all other things form a dynamic unity. This helps clarify what Dogen means when he says: "Therefore, the self and environment of sentient beings-whole being is not in the least involved in the amazing influences of karma, . . . ."[34] This must be understood in the light of the nondual view of whole being and Buddha-nature. In other words just as Buddha-nature is not effected by karma so sentient beings-whole being is not effected by it. In enlightenment the comprehensive interpentration of all things is experienced; then, there is no longer any distinction to be made. When Dogen turns to discuss the Senika heresy, the view that there is an essential permanent self, it becomes clear that, for him, the Buddha-nature is the true self which is the very ground of being. However, this Buddha-nature as the true self is not a permanent substance nor is it the process of nature. In a sense the Buddha-nature is enlightenment itself. But this is not enlightenment in its ordinary sense; this is enlightenment as the manifestation of whole being, and this manifestations always concretized in a "true face of a Buddha." This way of talking about the Buddha-nature and the true self sounds substantialistic, and thus, Dogen turns to emphasize the "no Buddha-nature" and the bottomlessness of whole being.[35] This turns Buddha-nature into "impermanence-Buddha nature," and the true self into the impermanence-self.[36] Here the true self unites oneself and the world, it unites Buddha-nature and whole being, in and through its realization of impermanence. In this sense, the true self is to be enlightened to impermanence, especially its own.

The concept of the enlightened self plays a major role in "Bendowa." "Bendowa" is divided into two parts: the first gives an exposition of jijuyu sanmai (or samadhi) and the later presents a series of questions and answers. Here I want to focus on the jijuyu samadhi section, and I would like to argue that Dogen’s discussion of his journey to China, finding a master and attaining enlightenment display his own particular manifestation of jijuyu samadhi. As is usual for Dogen the opening paragraph sets the tone of the essay:[37]

In this passage we see that jijuyu samadhi sums up the whole of Buddhism since Buddhism is primarily a religion-philosophy based on and "proven" by one’s own enlightenment experience. Taken literally jijuyu samadhi means the enlightenment (samadhi) which "oneself" (ji) "receives" (ju) and "applies" (yu). The expression jijuyu is conceptually loaded. "Ju" (to receive) was used by the Chinese Buddhists to translate one of the five skandhas, the aggregate of perception (samjñª ). Thus, in this notion of "receiving" there is an implied connotation of "perceiving" or knowing the way things are. "Yu" means to "use" or to "apply;" however, the Neo-Confucian school of the Sung dynasty (960-1279) had given yu (ch. yung) a cosmic function—everything has its t’i-yung its form and function. Taken together "juyu" literally means "to receive for use," and then a derived meaning is "enjoyment," what one receives and applies gives enjoyment. This form of enjoyment-activity is exemplary of the Sambhogakaya (ch. Pao Shen), the functioning glorious bliss body of the Buddha, and this term, juyu literally means "to receive for use," and then a derived meaning is "enjoyment," what one receives and applies gives enjoyment. This form of enjoyment-activity is exemplary of the Sambhogakaya (ch. Pao Shen), the functioning glorious bliss body of the Buddha, and this term, juyu, denotes the very realm of the Sambhogakaya, that is, the juyutu, or more specifically jijuyutu, which is the third of four Buddha-ksetra or Buddha-domains wherein there is complete response to his teachings and powers. The character "ji" literally means "oneself;" it is also an adverb meaning "from," combining the two meanings it serves as a reflexive prefix meaning "deriving from or occasioned by oneself." Its most common expression is in the character binome jinen (ch. tzu-jan) which is the self-so-nature of things, and cam to mean the intersubjective ground of nature. Again, it must be noted that for the Chinese, and the Japanese too, this spontaneous natural manifestation of self-so-ing does not mean that independent eternal substances arise out of nothingness, but rather the particular is always defined in its context and relationship to each and every other. The concept "jijuyu" carries with it this jinen connotation such that the full expression would mean: the natural enjoyment of receiving and applying one’s very own enlightenment experience on a sustained and continuous basis. Furthermore, the character "ji" must not be considered as referring to some desire-centered self as it does in expressions like "as one does so one receives" (ch. tzu-tso tzu-shou). The character "ji" has another important connotation which cannot be overlooked in discussing Dogen; it is also used in the expression jisho (ch. tzu cheng) self-awakening, or self-verifying. And Jishoshen was a title for Vairocana Buddha, by far the most important manifestation of Buddha for the Japanese of Dogen’s period because Vairocana was associated with Amaterasu the sun-goddess and ancestor of the Japanese Emperor and peoples.

Moreover, the expression jijuyu samadhi is commonly distinguished from tajuyu samadhi, the activity that has others receive and use the joy of their awakening.[38] It is clear form the opening section of "Bendowa" that jijuyu samadhi provided the place ". . . for transmitting the wondrous Dharma from one to another without alteration . . . ." In other words jijuyu samadhi is used in a comprehensive sense which includes self-awakening and other-awakening. As Abe and Waddell note: "For jijuyu in its absolute sense is the basic source of tajuyu, including tajuyu in its own development."[39] Again, in both Chinese and Buddhist world-views, self and other are interdependent and interpenetrating—one cannot be defined without the other. Just as the myriad things come forth with Chuang tzu, so all sentient beings are enlightened along with Dogen. As Dogen put it in his own words:[40]

This is the comprehensive jijuyu which entails both self-enlightenment and other enlightenment. It is the fundamental place of experience in which the interpenetration and impermanence of all things is realized.

For Dogen, the manifestation of jijuyu is fully expressed in sitting meditation, zazen. As Abe and Waddell point out:[41]

Because Dogen stressed the unity of practice (zazen) and awakening (satori) which is expressed in the motto: "Just sit meditation" (shikan taza), it is not surprising to find Dogen contending that the practice occurs in the realm of and is manifested as jijuyu samadhi. Dogen himself brings this out in "Bendowa" when he says:[42]

Here Dogen emphasizes the practice side of jijuyu, but it cannot be separated from the attainment of jijuyu enlightenment, nor can practice and attainment be distinguished form the palace of practice and enlightenment (that is, jijuyutu). Seen in this light, it becomes clear why "Bendowa," which was Dogen’s introductory essay to the practice of Zen, stresses jijuyu because it is the basic principle for manifesting the unity of practice and attainment. Furthermore, it also becomes clear why "Bendowa" outlines the transmission of the Dharma from Sakyamuni to Mahakasyapa, through Bodhidharma and the Chinese masters, coming to Dogen’s own master Ju-ching and then, to Dogen’s own enlightenment experience. This transmitting of the Dharma is the very realization of jijuyu as the dynamic particularization and endless manifestation of the Buddha Way. It discloses jijuyu as the "transmission from oneself to oneself" in that experience one’s master is ultimately none other than the Buddha-nature of impermanence which is one’s self.

At the risk of overgeneralization, I make these points to highlight the different models of self. Although Dogen generates a unique understanding of "self," it is generally in keeping with Buddhist as well as Confucian and Taoist points of view. Generally speaking, I would argue that the "problem of self" in much of East Asian thought—Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism, and Toaism—is defined in terms of "integration" and not "reunification." The "problem of self" is nicely defined in terms of "reunification" in monistic and dualistic models of self. For example, in monistic Hindu models of self, the psychological self (jiva) is restrained and the true self is reunited with ultimate reality (Brahman-atman). Or in the dualistic models there is a tendency to seek reunification of disparate faculties of the person, such as emotion/reason, or pleasure principle/reality principle. Of course, the reunification model has had a great impact on our theories of psychology and psychotherapy. On the other hand, the integration model fuses the mind-body complex by integrating consciousness with bodily-activity. The body-behavior is "trained" in appropriating certain postures, for instance communing with nature Taoistically, being a filial Confucian, sitting zazen, which disclose a conscious attitude. Mind no longer controls body as in common experience, but mind and body form an integral harmonization.[43] since the mind-body problem does not arise, there is no problem of other minds, for any one’s consciousness is displayed through their body-activity. The problem of personal identity is dissolved in most Asian philosophy because their ontologies stress the importance of change and impermanence. This is especially true for Dogen. Any concern for an identity which remains the same over time would be discounted as delusion by Dogen. One’s "identity" is contained in one’s present body-activity; it is not an abstract idea of who one is, but rather a concrete instance of what one is doing. The integration model presents a way for the creative disclosure of one’s natural self.

[1] Thomé H. Fang, The Chinese View of Life. (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co. Ltd., 1980), p. 9.

[2] David Hume, A Treatis of Human Nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 1.4.6.

[3] Though Hume recognized problems with the stage metaphor, still his epistemology leans toward an essentialistic substance self.

[4] This is not so for Hume’s epistemology, wherein he implies a substantialistic self as bearer of the perceptions.

[5] Of course, there are a number of non-substantialistic thinkers among the phenomenologists and existentialists who make for interesting comparisons with Dogen. For example, see Carl Olson. "The Human Body as a Boundary Symbol: A Comparison of Merleau-Ponty and Dogen." Philosophy East & West, vol. xxxvi, no. 2, 1986, 107-120.

[6] This strict definition may be in need of a caveat; here it is applicable only to Buddhism, especially Ch’an/Zen, and Taoism, especially Chuang Tzu. It will not work for Hume, and needs qualification to be applied to a Confucian, like Mencius.

[7] Gerald Swanson, "The Concept of Change in the Great Treatise," in Henry Rosemont ed. Explorations in early Chinese Cosmology, Journal of American Academy of Religious Studies, vol. 50, no. 2, 1984, pp. 67 ff, prefers the expression "alternation and transformation." Rosemont prefers "generation, degeneration, and regeneration." I prefer generation and decay because it captures both the birth, generating, and the death, decay, cycles in the process of transformation.

[8] For a detailed analysis of tzu te see my paper "Three models of Self-integration in Early China," Philosophy East & West, vol. xxxvii, no. 4, October, 1987, 372-391.

[9] I have chose to use the term "self" for two reasons: first, the Sino-Japanese character tzu/ji is more properly "self" than "person" or "individual;" and second, the Sino-Japanese character "tzu" is used, just as the English "self," as a self-reflective pronoun as in "oneself, herself, itself, self-so." Moreover, I hope to show that the Chinese and Ch’an/Zen understanding of "self" and "person" are not so sharply distinguished as analytic terms. Deutsch sets up the distinctions such that "individual" and "self" are givens, and "person" is achieved, but he acknowledges that person is grounded in spiritual being, the self, Personhood, Creativity, and Freedom, p. 33. And I would like to take it a step further and propose that just as the body becomes stronger with exercise, the self too achieves deeper integration with the development of personhood.

[10] Thomé H. Fang, The Chinese View of LIfe. pp. 15-16.

[11] Analects, 12/1; also see Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius, (New York: Vintage Books, 1938), pp. 74-75, and p. 152 n 1. Although Waley disagrees that the k’o here means "to overcome," still he generally accepts the standard idea that the Confucians sought to restrain the desire-centered, selfish quality of a personal self.

[12] Concordance to Chuang tzu, Harvard Yenching Index, no. 20, 9/4/25 ff, and see the Lieh tzu story of the man from Sung who forgot himself which is referred to at note twenty below, both Taoists and Buddhists emphasize self-forgetting.

[13] See R. C Zaehner, Mysticism Sacred and Profane. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957); where he distinguishes between different forms of mysticism.

[14] For an insightful discussion of anatman and Buddhist process ontology see Kenneth K. Inada, "Problematics of the Buddhist Nature of Self," Philosophy East & West, vol. xxix, no. 2, 1979, 141-158.

[15] Following Deutsch’s translations, Personhood . . . Freedom, p. 2.

[16] Tamaki Koshiro, "The Position of Dogen in the History of Buddhist Thought," Acta Asiatica, vol. 20, March, 1970, 11-17.

[17] Abe Masao, "Dogen on Buddha Nature," Eastern Buddhist, vol. iv, no. 1, May, 1971, 54 and 100.

[18] Tamaki Koshiro, "The Position of Dogen in the History of Buddhist Thought," op. cit., 15-16.

[19] Normal Waddell and Abe Masao, "Shobogenzo Genjokoan," Eastern Buddhist, vol. v, no. 2, October, 1972, 134.

[20] A. C. Graham, The Book of Lieh tzu, (London: John Murray, 1960), 70-71.

[21] Normal Waddell and Abe Masao, "Shobogenzo Genjokoan," p.132.

[22] Ibid., p. 132 n 2.

[23] Ibid., p. 134. Of course, this passage can be interpreted in a number of ways.

[24] Ibid., p. 134 n 4.

[25] Ibid., pp. 134-135. Here I have modified Abe’s and Waddell’s translation slightly; I hyphenate the body-mind expression as a reminder against latent Cartesianism of a mind/body dualism. Dogen’s famous expression shinjin datsuraku "dropping the body-mind" is a watch against clinging to a monistic or dualistic conception of self as body and/or mind. Abe is in full agreement with this modification, personal correspondence, November, 1986.

[26] Abe Masao, "Philosophy of Dogen," a seminar held at the University of Hawaii, April 10, 1985. Of course Nishida was strongly influenced by Dogen.

[27] Waddell and Abe, op. cit., p. 135 n 9. See note 25, above. Francis H. Cook, "Dogen’s View of Authentic Selfhood and Its Socio-ethical Implications," in Dogen Studies, ed. by W. R. Lafleur, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 138-139. Cook and I basically come to the same conclusion. His interpretation, however, is couched in existential terminology, and I have attempted to avoid Western philosophical terminology in explicating Dogen’s thought.

[28] Ibid., p. 135.

[29] Ibid., p. 135 n 10.

[30] I prefer Abe’s and Waddell’s expression "whole being" to Cook’s, following Kim’s, "whole universe" because for the Buddhist there is a multiverse not a single universe; "whole being" should be understood to mean all of existence, all sentient beings. Whole being is italicized in order to remind the reader of its special meaning for Dogen. Whole being, for Dogen, is not an Aristotelian organic whole which is greater than the sum of its parts.

[31] Norman Waddell and Abe Masao, "Shobogenzo Buddha-nature," Eastern Buddhist, vol. viii, no. 2, October, 1975, 97.

[32] Waddell and Abe, "Shobogenzo Buddha-nature," op. cit., 97,n 10.

[33] Ibid., pp. 98.

[34] Ibid., pp. 98-99.

[35] See Abe Masao, "Dogen on Buddha Nature," op. cit., 46.

[36] Ibid., pp. 52-55, see especially Diagram Five.

[37] Normal Waddell, and Abe Masao, "Dogen’s Bendowa," Eastern Buddhist, vol. 4, no. 1, May, 1971, 128.

[38] Waddell and Abe, "Dogen’s Bendowa," Ibid., 128, n 7.

[39] Ibid., p. 128.

[40] Ibid., p. 136.

[41] Ibid., p. 129, n 7.

[42] Ibid., p. 133.

[43] For an interesting elaboration of the identity of mind and body in action see, Shigenori Nagatoma, "Zeami’s Conception of Freedom," Philosophy East & West, vol. xxxi, no. 4, 1981, 405-410.