[Editor’s Note:] Editor Suncrates wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Professor Inada for acceptance of his invitation to contribute this article in honor of Thomé Fang, in 1987. With the unique privilege of being being taught both by D. T. Suzuki and Hajime Nagamura in Japan, and educated in U.S. A. and Canada of the West, Professor Inada is one of the most distinguished scholars with cross-cultural background we ever have. Equally conversant in Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, Japanese, and the Western languages such as English, French, German, etc., he is an acclaimed world authority especially on the Madhymika School of N~ garjun~ , the Zen School and the Pure Land Sect in Mahayana Buddhism. For decades he served as Director of the Asian and Comparative Philosophy Project, State University of New York at Buffalo, N. Y.; and was awarded "Distinguished Service Professor" before his retirement in the mid-90s.

Nearly half a century ago, Filmer S.C. Northrop expounded his now famous theory on the categories of experience, i.e., the aesthetic and theoretic components of things, as a unique way of inducing a cultural meeting ground between the East and West. Much of course has occurred and changed since. The meeting ground for instance has changed profoundly in ways that no one could have imagined, then and now, for World War II was soon followed by the Korean Conflict which in turn by the Vietnam War, all of which accelerated and fostered the commingling of psychological, religious, social, cultural, economic and political elements. Should Northrop appear on the scene today, he would most certainly be astonished by the breadth and depth of the interchange on the global basis, an interchange that shows no signs of a let up; indeed, it will increase more and more, well into the 21^st century.

It is now time to pause for a critical visitation of the Northropian categories. In this brief essay I shall focus on the following three aspects:

It was at the first East-West Philosophers’ Conference held in Honolulu in 1939 that Northrop first presented the categories of experience.[1] Although only a handful of scholars from both the East and West were in residence, it was a carefully selected group which proved to be a landmark conference of its kind, conceived and ably directed by Charles A. Moore of the University of Hawaii. It set the stage, spirit and standard for subsequent series of conferences.

In retrospect, however, none of the subsequent four conferences can be said to have distinguished itself in terms of contributing a unique character as compared with the initial conference, although all subsequent conferences did not lack the presence of and contributions by well known high caliber scholars from the respective traditions. None of the contributors, however, provided the ideological and methodological framework in which to work out the East-West dialogues, to set astir further philosophical discussion. Much of the effort had been channeled in the direction of "mutual exchange and mutual understanding" of the different phases of cultures and civilizations. In a word, the meeting ground expanded considerably but in the process it became diluted by pluralistic and relativistic elements which stymied any fruitful dialogues aspired by the scholars. Certainly, the respective exposure to and knowledge of each tradition, East and West, had not been at par in the beginning and so these conferences served their important roles of opening up the avenues for mutual understanding and rapprochement. Considered in this light, the conferences have had a definite positive effect which is still being felt in many quarters long after the proceedings. The conferences were organized along the thematic lines and yet, as valuable as they are, it simply was too much for the director to control and guide the thought and contributions of the respective scholars, especially in light of the fact that the conferences got larger and larger and the interval of ten years between conferences was later reduced to five years.

Considered within the context of the above situation, Northropian categories of experience fared quite well in spite of the severe scrutiny and immediate criticism. The criticisms will be taken up in the next section but suffice it to say that the categories are still alive as evidenced by the numerous references made on them over the years by a wide range of scholars in the various disciplines.

Northrop starts off with a bold and adventurous spirit to arrive at a common understanding of ordinary experience. His logical and scientific background dictated that he seek a common denominator to determine the relation between diverse things. [2] And, furthermore, "before there can be a trustworthy comparative analysis of Oriental and Occidental philosophical doctrines, there must be an unambiguous, commensurable terminology in which to express them. When such a terminology is provided, certain very interesting and important relationships appear." [3] Thus he sets out confidently to seek a technical terminology.

He concludes that there are two major types of concepts, i.e., concepts by intuition and concepts by postulation. A concept is a term to which meaning is assigned and this occurs in two ways. The first way is by being associated denotatively with some datum or set of data which is given immediately and the second way is by having its meaning mailto:me@g

proposed theoretically by the postulates of the deductive theory in which it occurs."[4] He expands thus:[5]

According to Northrop, concepts by intuition refer to positivism, not of the Comtean type but where simple direct contact is made with reality by way of the immediately apprehended. By contrast, concepts by postulation refer to indirectly apprehended world or the world of science which is able to "introduce unobservable entities and relations into its theory, and to predict the existence of scientific objects theoretically which are confirmed experimentally only later, and even then only indirectly."[6] From this he concludes that the aesthetic (intuitive) and theoretic (postulational) components of things are ultimate and irreducible. These exponents of things are ultimate and irreducible. "These components make up our ordinary experience in its basic natures. Yet, ordinary experience manifests in diverse ways and to justify them Northrop discusses the possible types under the two concepts by postulation and intuition.

First, the concepts by postulation.[7]

factors which are in part sensed and in part imagined.

1. Monistic. E.g. The public space of daily life.
2. Pluralistic. E.g. Other persons, tables, chairs, and the spheri cal moon with its back side which we do not see as well as its presented side which we do see.

The above is certainly an extensive coverage of the concepts by postulation and should be noted that an important connection with the concepts by intuition is made in the last section. To wit, since logical concepts by intuition are concepts by postulation merely so far as their immortality is concerned and are concepts by intuition with respect to their content, they provide a natural transition from the one generic type of concept to the other.[8] And thus the concepts by intuition come into play.

Northrop asserts that any experience must start with the all-embracing immediacy and from which any theory arises. And this immediacy exhibits itself as a continuum or field which is differentiated. From these premises, he concludes on the nature of the differentiated aesthetic continuum. He elaborates: the "continuum" denotes the immediately apprehended as an all-embracing field, one factor is different from another, as for example the factor may be "blue" here but "white" there; and the "aesthetic" denotes the qualitatively ineffable, emotionally moving continuum of colors, sounds, and feelings that an artist, for example, presents in the immediacy.[9] Out of all this, he neatly classifies the major possible concepts by intuition thus:[10]

1. The Concept of the Differentiated Aesthetic Continuum. Reference to the totality of the immediately apprehended.
2. The Concept of the Indefinite or Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum. Reference to the intuited continuum apart from all differentiations.
3. The Concepts of the Differentiations. Refeience to the various qualities, factors, etc., apart from the continuum.
4. Field Concepts by Inspection. Reference to the differentiations inseparable from the intuited continuum.

These concepts point at the positivistic grounds of all experiences for in the Northropian sense, positivism is the thesis that there are only concepts by intuition."[11] By this he means that all non-theoretic intuitive experiences are direct and immediate, a way that characterizes all Eastern ways of life. In short, he brings all Asiatic traditions under the sway of his brand of positivism. For example, the Hindu is a thoroughgoing positivist as there are no concepts by postulation but only concepts by intuition."[12] He elaborates by saying that the Brahman is that from which all qualities have been separated. It is not an unseen, imagined or thought postulated entity. But when one separates from the totality of the immediately apprehended all differentiations and distinguishable qualities, only the indefinite or undifferentiated intuited continuum remains. This undifferentiated is the "cosmical principle" or Brahman." [13] Moreover, the intuition of the undifferentiated is the "psychical principle" or the } tman ("Great Self), thus establishing the identity of Brahman and } tman."[14]

Northrop expands:

In a similar vein, he speaks thus of Madhyamika Buddhism:[16]

Likewise with Chinese thought, Northrop goes on to give his positivistic account of Taoism and Confucianism. He says, "the primary factor (in Taoism) is the indeterminate ineffable material of intuition from which comes the differentiations which are grasped within it through the determinate senses and specific introspection."[18] Confucianism, on the other hand, is "defined as the state of mind in which the concept of the indeterminate intuited manifold moves into the background of thought and the concrete differentiations in their relativistic, humanistic, transitory comings and goings form the content of philosophy."[19] The emphasis is more on the humanistic side of the determinate aesthetic continuum in Confucianism but on the naturalistic side in Taoism. The Confucian Jen is determinate to the individual concerned but indeterminate in terms of its ultimate extensive humanistic nature which has lasting values in human relationship. The lasting values come in virtue of the felt undifferentiated aesthetic continuum which is not only unlimited but timeless in contrast to the determinate, transitory and perpetually changing differentiations."[20]

Northrop concludes that reality for the Oriental is not merely the indeterminate aesthetic continuum but also the determinate differentiations, equally aesthetic, given through the senses which appear in it." [21] So that any [aesthetic things] immediately apprehended, in Taoism, Confucianism or even in Buddhism and Hinduism, are determinate and therefore only temporary and transitory; it is mortal, not immortal. What is immortal is the immediately apprehended aesthetic field component which is experienced by all persons in all aesthetic things, in short, the field of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum. This is the nature of the Brahman, } tman, Chit (consciousness), Nirv~ na, Tao and Jen. In sum, then, Northropian categories efficiently cover the Eastern and Western traditions alike and make way for a meeting ground. And so we move on to the final contribution in his methodology.

Northrop, time and again, asserts that the East emphasizes on the aesthetic component and the West the theoretic and that, as both are complementary phases of experience, each tradition has much to learn from the other. Where the West developed science because of its emphasis on the theoretic or postulational method, the East lagged behind because of its preoccupation with the aesthetic and the undifferentiated continuum. On the other hand, the West is blamed for trying to deduce the aesthetic nature from the theoretic, an attempt which has failed and stymied the scientific effort as witnessed by the relativistic perspective brought on by the theories of Einstein and Heisenberg. Indeed, he rightly asserts that it always should have been the other way around, i.e., deduction from the aesthetic to the theoretic."[22]

Having established the ultimate and irreducible components of the intuitive (aesthetic) and postulational (theoretic), Northrop sees that both components would be meaningless and ineffective tn any dialogue unless they are somehow brought together. Here is where he introduces the novel concept of "epistemic correlations." It is that which relates a thing known empirically in its aesthetic component to what is in some sense that same thing known postulationally in its theoretic component."[23] In short, the epistemic correlations join intuited reality to postulated reality."[24] But how is this possible? He asserts that the intuited relates to the postulated by virtue of the "symbolic character of the immediately apprehended, the capacity to point beyond itself to the postulational." [25] He expands:

Here he invokes Albert Einstein’s words: "Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense-experience correlated to a logically uniform system of thought. In this system single experiences must be correlated with the theoretic structure in such a way that the resulting coordination is complete and convincing."[27]

Northrop emphatically states that the West simply got caught up in the power of symbolic character and neglected the source, the intuitive or immediately apprehended nature; the East, on its part, rather than understanding the postulated nature arising from the symbolic character, turned to other means like Yoga or Buddhist negative dialectics to capture the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum in its fullness. On both sides, there is a lack of understanding the complete nature and function of epistemic correlations.[28]

He emphasizes the fact that both the aesthetic and theoretic components are required. An ideal society must return to the primitive intuition of the past with respect to its aesthetically grounded portion and advance to the sophisticated science of the present with respect to its theoretically based part."[29] People must move forward to the scientific theory of the future, taking along the primitive aesthetic intuition of the past. This, in short, is the program for tomorrow and he specifically labels it "the philosophy of natural science."[30]

Thus have I presented a capsuled analysis of the Northropian categories of experience, touching upon the salient points, and for the most part using his own words. Now, we must shift to a critique of his methodology.

Northrop capped his epistemology in 1946 with the award winning book, The Meeting of East and West.[31] Written during the World War II and its immediate aftermath, it was a bold attempt at "an inquiry concerning world understanding," as the subtitle indicates. The United Nations Organization was established in 1945 and everyone was euphoric and set to enjoy life in peace and freedom for many years to come. Northrop’s philosophy was quite simple: Let the nations of the world get closer together by focusing on a common epistemic ground of discourse. The nature of that epistemic ground is what we have been discussing in the previous section, namely, the aesthetic and theoretic components of things and their epistemic correlations.

Within a few years, however, Northrop’s philosophy was critically examined from both Western and Eastern quarters, from those who knew little or nothing about Eastern thought to those who knew it well which included native scholars of the East. Some were conciliatory in regard to the categories, some maintained aloofness or strict reservations concerning them and some were resolutely opposed by taking a very skeptical and negative stand. Let us examine some of the views.

Auburey Castell was highly skeptical of The Meeting of East and West. He said he read it as a story and an argument."[32] In expanding on this, he had two grave doubts about the work:

The first, on philosophical beliefs, has to do with the extensive manner in which Northrop went about setting up the Western ideological posture of scientific methodology that began with the early Greeks and ends with Einstein in cosmology. He did the same with the East, except that now instead of the theoretic or scientific orientation, the emphasis is on the intuitive or aesthetic component of things. Whether the philosophical beliefs based on both components of things can be taken to be legitimate and effective in leading to a meeting of the East and West is a mute question, according to Castell.

Secondly, based on both components of things, it is highly unlikely that the doctrine of epistemic correlations would really work not only in the West or in the East but in a cross-cultural situation. More particularly, Castell looks dubiously at the following Northropian statement:

That conception of good conduct and the good state is the correct one, valid for everybody, which rests upon the conception of man and nature as determined by immediate apprehension with respect to the aesthetic component and by the methods of natural science with respect to the theoretic component; procedures which, when correctly applied, give the same results for one person that they give for another.[34]

Northrop had infinite faith in his procedures but for Castell it was an argument that couldn’t be sustained and bordered on the fictional, a story that finally cannot be affirmed nor realized.

A near unanimous criticism, coming from both East and West, has to do with Northrop’s monolithic treatment of the various Eastern cultural traditions. We have already seen where Brahman, } tman, Chit, Jen, Tao and Nirvana are all taken to be fundamentally the same and identified with the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum. This sweeping view was quickly denied by many scholars, including Walter T. Stace. Restricting himself to Hinduism, Stace counters the argument presented by Northrop that the Brahman is undifferentiated and indeterminate and that it could only be grasped by intuitions.[35] He points out, fire of all, that Yoga, a discipline in intuitive comprehension par excellence, is not aiming at the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum in any narrow or restrictive sense at all and that in the case of Brahman, it has its differentiable nature, i.e., Hinduism accepts the identity of the differentiated and undifferentiated continuum, contrary to Northrop’s understanding of wholly undifferentiated nature. The concept of M~ y~ or illusion is always a vital perceptual component of the differentiated phenomenal realm of existence and is, in the final analysis, the very focus of the meditative discipline that liberates the self from attachment to that realm; otherwise, the final or ultimate identity of the } tman and Brahman would not be possible.

Another strong criticism by Stace has to do with the "extent to which ideological and philosophical factors govern history."[36] Apparently, None maintains deep faith in those factors. Stace asserts that Northrop exaggerates die influence of philosophy on culture and also science on philosophy; yet the truth of the matter is that, according to Stace, the influence is mutually bound from the beginning in each instance.[37] In reality, then, one cannot assign a dominant role to either philosophy or science. There are, after all, other important factors, such as, religion, economics, politics, etc., which constantly come into play in molding the total spirit and nature of any particular cultural tradition.

To Northrop’s contention that the East could not develop a scientific method due to its preoccupation with the immediately apprehended aesthetic continuum, no less a figure than Hu Shih countered immediately and tellingly. He said that "the bifurcation of the intuitive (aesthetic) and postulational (theoretic) components is untrue and unhistorical so far as the intellectual history of China is concerned."[38] He emphasizes that the employment of technical language does not in itself affirm a dichotomy and, moreover, ordinary man in ordinary ways is constantly engaged in both the postulational and intuitive grasp of things. Furthermore, the Confucian tradition with its profound emphasis on the love of learning has admirably fostered the scientific spirit, a kind of Chinese "Socratic Method."[39] He expands:’

This marvelous statement certainly has a contemporary ring to it and is subscribed to by many a scholar and layman, especially in this age of the Pacific Basin where cultural and economic exchanges have increasingly heightened in a most natural and expeditious way. Japan, followed by other Asian countries, has attested to the fact of "scientific tradition" and has demonstrated that both cultural and scientific pursuits can go hand in hand without the slightest disruption or opposition.

E. R. Hughes takes a similar stand on the scientific method inherent in the Chinese tradition. He questions, however, the narrow interpretation of the postulational concept, the restrictive use of Northropian postulates as mere "mathematicals" and "physicals."[41] The Chinese view, by contrast, depicts an orientation where man and things are in basic affinity at all times. And so the methodology must not be dichotomous, an "either-or" situation, but a more inclusive "both-and" condition which incorporates both the postulational and intuitive components. Thus, Hughes boldly asserts that the postulational method must extend beyond science arid mathematics and include the intuitive (aesthetic) concepts.[42] Here Hughes makes a startling statement: "the two concepts of jen and yin-yang.: concepts which have exercised so profound an influence on Chinese ways of thinking, are concepts by postulation, not concepts by intuition in the Northropian sense.[43] He justifies the postulational nature or, jen by introducing a syllogistic analysis of man and society."[44] On yin-yang, the early Chinese apprehended the two forces, heaven and nature, as distinguished but vitally related arid from which all phenomena are produced. From this, they analyzed "a cosmic situation in their minds, and—I would say—arrived at a hypothesis that there were two theoretic forces behind this range of phenomena viewed as a whole: a constructive force and a destructive force working in conjunction, the one the logical antithesis of the other, but the two working as one indivisible existential process."[45]

Hughes’ argument is plausible and should of course be understood within the "both-and" context, i.e., both the intuitive and theoretic component of things. Edwin A. Burtt also follows this line of argument and compliments Northrop for taking on a neutral terminology for relating the East and West but criticizes the methodology for "his failure to realize that knowledge, in the East, is more than an intellectual affair, his belief that Chinese and Indian philosophies exemplify a single type, and his apparent assumption that a valid reconciliation between East and West can be worked out in advance of active methodological cooperation on the part of thinkers representing these diverse cultures."[46] Burtt’s last point is quite cogent. A methodology seen from one Westerner’s standpoint, however ingenious and powerful it may be, still lacks the force of applying to cultures other than one’s own. A cooperative effort is indeed a desideratum from the very beginning.

In recent years, Herbert Fingarette, representing the Chinese scene, has returned to this "both-and" theme in Ws thought-provoking work, Confucius—The Secular as Sacred.[47] It is an insightful analysis of the substances of existence "as the ceremony," that the "vision of man as a ceremonial being." "He ends the analysis thus:"

Human life in its entirety finally appears as one vast, spontaneous and holy Rite: the community of man. This, for Confucius, was indeed an ‘ultimate concern’; it was, he said, again and again, the only thing that mattered, more than the individual’s life itself.[48]

The Confucian interpretation, in this sense, did not fall into the trap of a neatly outlined categorization of man but focused on his holistic nature, the total behavioral and performative aspects.

A severe criticism came from P. J. Saber. He refers to the Northropian methodology as a dangerous over-simplification.[49] Taking cue from Einstein’s successful reduction of physics to a single algebraic equation (E=MC²), Northrop tried to do the same for comparative philosophy. He reduced the realization of the whole truth to an "either-or" situation thus: Either "W = E" (Western philosophy = Eastern wisdom) or "W + E".[50]

Northrop opted for the second algebra, "W + E", and went on to assert his theory of complementary phases in which both the theoretic and intuitive components come into play. But Saber objects in that the intuitive component in the East is of a different nature than what is assumed in the West. In fact, the attitudes toward the theoretic and intuitive components by the East and West again differ drastically from the outset and, in consequence, any attempt to incorporate the two phases in the Northropan sense is quite problematic and bound to fail.[51]

Chinese thinker, on the whole, are more accommodative than rejective of the Northropian methodology. Y. P. Mei, for example, says that without subscribing to all the uses of the term by Northrop, one might say that jen was to Confucius "an immediately apprehended aesthetic continuum."[52] This is a rather innocuous statement but it does maintain some reservations on the methodology and does not pursue nor suggest any positive endorsement of Northropian concepts.

Fung Yu-lan, on the other hand, is more specific and critical. He believes that, although Northrop’s methodology with the concepts by intuition and by postulation shows a keen understanding of the difference between Chinese and Western philosophy, the methodology stops short of a full accounting of Chinese view of life. Thus he says, "those philosophers who start with concepts by postulation have a lilting for the distinct, while those who start with intuition value the indistinct."[53] From the Chinese farmer to the intellectual, they all thrive on the indistinct, the non-being rather than being which is distinct; but they all apprehend reality in the immediacy or intuitively. And, finally in the aesthetic continuum, there is no demarcation of any kind but only wholeness and unity between the knower and the known."

Thus have we seen a fair amount of criticism of Northropian categories of experience. We now move on and consider whether they are still sound and worth pursuing.

Northrop has certainly contributed to the field of comparative thought as no other Western thinker has done in the 20^th century. In a sense he has legitimized the emerging field of comparative philosophy by tracking down the foundations of man’s experience and relating them in intercultural exchanges and understanding. All comparativists have encountered the categories of experience and, though critical of them in one form or another, they have all benefited by the sharp focus he gave to the problematics of ordinary experience and the possible way out. Most of the criticism we have covered in the previous section, I believe, have been constructive in a sense of describing the shortcomings but at the same time indicating the factors that must be considered to shore up his epistemology. Although the categories may today remain in a relatively shadowy existence, it is possible that they may return and reassert themselves in different ways, unimaginable now perhaps, due to the heightened East-West exchanges in all areas of existence.

Let us have a closer look at the categories in relationship to Northrop the man. Northrop was a child of the Western tradition and remained so, although he later expressed extreme fascination and love of things Eastern, especially the Chinese and Japanese cultures. This background showed up clearly in his preferential treatment of the categories. Of the two categories, he decidedly favored the theoretic or postulational and made it the standard for any accommodation in East-West exchanges. He did not deviate from this stand and went on deceiving himself that the East had more to learn from the West rather than the West from East. So even if the East could contribute its well developed culture based on the aesthetic component, he only saw it as a mere complementary phase to the dominant scientific methodology. The aesthetic component, being also ultimate and irreducible, should have been equal to the theoretic, as he said it was, but in function he made it a handmaiden to the theoretic. It amounted to a semblance of equality. This is a basic flaw in his theory of categories and the theory was thereby skewed forever.

By upholding the supremacy of the theoretic component, he turned his back on his teacher, Alfred N. Whitehead.[54] Where Whitehead focused on the aesthetic to resolve the bifurcation in nature, Northrop staunchly maintained the theoretic to support and build on the powerful scientific methodology sweeping the West, despite his admission of the positivistic and aesthetic nature of immediate apprehension.

Like Heidegger and others, Whitehead also sought the soundings of reality in the poets—Hölderlin and Wordsworth, for example. They knew well the limits of language and thought, a position also made obvious in the writings of Wittgenstein who bordered on the mystical. For philosophers of this genre, philosophy itself and anything philosophical, in the final analysis, pale into indistinction and no amount of rational or speculative discourse could penetrate nor unravel the true nature of experiential reality. Northrop did not listen to these men which include the existentialists for he quickly brushed them aside as inconsequential or even harmful to his attempt at world synthesis. He was either blind to the full nature of the aesthetic or was blinded by the power of scientific methodology. In either case, he had an opportunity to correct himself early on and to extricate himself from the self-imposed theoretic conundrum but he did not and thus his theory suffers badly.

The Northropian tilt toward the theoretic ought to be adjusted such that the tilt no longer persists and imposes on the other for, as Hu Shih and Hughes have rightly protested, the postulational method is not restricted to the sciences alone but always relevant to the very spirit of man’s basic thinking process whose elements may or may not be apparent at all times and are certainly deeply rooted in the cultural traditions.

This brings us to the nature of relationship between reality and methodology. Understanding this relationship, in a way, is the very core of the philosophical enterprise. Northrop’s overconfidence in scientific methodology as a way to reveal the reality of things, we have seen, only skewed reality. The Easterner will not subscribe to this condition since Northrop has not cleared up the proper relationship between methodology and reality. His concept of epistemic correlations is a beautiful attempt to relate concept and reality, to be sure, but the vital connection is wanting. Abstraction and symbolic reference are powerful means in discourse concerning reality but they remain methodological devices. Like the Cartesian dilemma in mind and body dichotomy, the Northropian ultimacy and irreducibility of the aesthetic and theoretic components bind us to an unrelenting dichotomy. At any rate, his methodological bias prevented him from fully recognizing and using the intuitional/ aesthetic component of things.

As stated earlier, Northrop looks to the aesthetic component for the opening to reality since it is the most direct and immediate apprehension of things. Up to this point, he is correct but then he does not pursue the matter beyond the mere methodological description and designation of the aesthetic nature. We must of course pursue the matter since it is a most fruitful area to explore.

First of all, as the Northropian concepts by intuition stand with reference to the four possibilities (p. 6), they are wholly conceptual classifications although reference to aspects of experiential reality is stated under each possibility. As it can be seen, Northjrop readily availed himself of such terms as totality, immediately apprehended, intuited continuum, differentiations, qualities, factors, apart from the continuum, and inseparable from the intuited continuum, but he does not go into any detailed analysis of them. It seems that he acquiesces in the sufficiency of ordinary understanding of these terms. In this respect, it would not be wrong to conclude that the concepts by intuition are methodological through and through and that, on the methodological level, his theory is consistent within that framework. However, when the methodology reaches out to reality, and there are different ideas on what reality is especially in the Eastern traditions, then trouble begins. Northrop’s solution was simply to organize the aesthetic component into the four possible concepts by intuition and thereby present them as justifiable correlates to the theoretic component by way of the possible concepts by postulation. Consequently, the epistemic correlations became for him the important bridge between the two irreducible realms and the "saving truth" to a discourse on reality.

What, then, is in store? Methodology is still a powerful means of disciplining the mind to focus on matters and, in this case, on the nature of experiential reality. Once of the hopeful signs is seen in Northrop’s treatment of the 4^th possible concept by intuition, i.e., Field concepts by inspection. He expands on it by stating that it involves differentiations which are not separated from the intuited continuum. This description is as close as Northrop will get to the Eastern conceptions of reality - in a word, to things as they are rightly perceived. Yet, Northrop did not know enough of the respective Eastern traditions to probe further. His knowledge was generally ,confide to secondary sources and to limited personal contacts with Asian scholars. Still, from such limited resources, it is to his credit that he developed a vision, a sweeping conceptual scheme, that covers the entire East. He was quite confident of the common thread that runs through the aesthetic East and which could be neatly sewn together with his theoretic postulates to form a world synthesis. In particular, he was fascinated by the identity of contrasting terms found in the Asiatic traditions, such as } tman-Brahman, vidy~ -avidy~ , sams~ ra-nirv~ na, ~ tman-an~ tman, yu-wu, yin-yang, and emptiness-nonemptiness (k’ung, pu-k’ung). But fascination stopped short of reality and he stood his methodological ground by choosing to bring the terms under his dipolar treatment of the differentiated and undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

At one point, he says that while the differentiated realm is temporal and transitory, the undifferentiated continuum is non-temporal and non-transitory, the former comes and goes within the continuum and, moreover, the continuum itself is not in time.[55] With this clear demarcation made between the differentiated and the undifferentiated, he accommodates the seeming identity of contrasting terms. There is something very unique and insightful here, we must admit. He is able to accommodate the differentiated temporal and transitory natures of the ordinary self (or experience), whether of Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian or Taoist origin, and then to go on further to accommodate the higher form or nature of the self in the undifferentiated realm. Thus, for example, he says that the Buddhist non-self doctrine (an~ tman) is really so because it belongs to the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.[56] Likewise, the Confucian concept of jen belongs to the undifferentiated in order to have relational cogency among men but it shows up in individuals as the differentiated. The Hindu concept of the ordinary self (~ tman), again, is a differentiated entity but in order for it to identify with the greater nature of Brahman, it must become the undifferentiated, Great Self (} tman).

All this is fine and dandy. Still, Northrop has not explained the nature of appearance and disappearance or the rise and subsidence of the differentiated within the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum. He takes events in nature to be matters of fact, but are they so from the experiential standpoint? It seems to be an indulgence in an ad hoc analysis. He merely distinguishes between the "immediately apprehended" and "immediately apprehended continuum," one transitory the other non-transitory, or one temporary the other non-temporal. Yet, he is vague and does not explain the reason for the existence of the non-transitory or non-temporal nature of things. Here, he may be following uncritically Einstein’s space-time continuum. Or, is it just another exercise in abstractive reference?

We have seen now that Northropian aesthetic component poses some fundamental problems. As scholars have intimated, the central point is the understanding of the nature of the aesthetic. For Northrop, the aesthetic is a highly conceptualized concept that fits and serves the theoretic methodology. In the East, however, there is an universal disdain for conceptualization as such; indeed ordinary reason has its place but in higher stages of life, it must be replaced by a higher form. So, primarily, the Eastern concept of the mind is more than an instrument for quantitative (theoretic) analysis but includes a qualitative character as well, the attainment of which is the goal of all but actually realizable by but a few. Secondly, Eastern aesthetic is a more extensive concept than the theoretic; in fact, by virtue of this extensiveness, it really encompasses all functions of the theoretic. All of reasoning process is basically aesthetic in this sense but then it has a limited ontological field of function. Northrop is not totally wrong when he attempts to bridge the postulational with the extensive intuitive nature. By extensiveness, the East in general takes the aesthetic as covering the whole realm of one’s existence although the cognizance and feel of it is not so obvious for the most part; thus the aesthetic has an existential or ontological character but without any atomic or elemental features, i.e., no realism of any type, for it extends unobstructively everywhere unless there are self-imposed limitations of the perceptual or conceptual nature. In this way, the concept of reality is, roughly speaking, another term for the total content of an aesthetic experience and which a methodology, such as Northrop’s, may help to focus on and narrow down but, ultimately, it will defy any description. Moreover, Northrop’s notion of the direct and positive nature of the aesthetic component will have been improved on by the recognition of the basic content, the "filler," of ones experience that is always continuous with nature and has a quality of its own.

I have presented here the general notion of Eastern aesthetic nature, Undoubtedly, there are similar features that are also found in Western aesthetic understanding. But even within the Eastern traditions, I would have to be the first to admit that there are variations and differences with respect to the understanding and implementation of the aesthetic nature. It certainly would take more than this essay to do justice on these matters. So rather than taking up any of them, I would like to conclude by indicating several fruitful areas which have relevance to the aesthetic nature and which should be explored with the aim of giving more balance to the Northropian methodology.

The first is the need for further exploration of the meditative discipline. The West has nearly forgotten this phase in human experience, although the early Greeks and modem man up to about the 17^th century had honored its role. Science initiated the sharp distinction between mind and matter, not only making it obvious but necessary in analysis. The separation of mind and matter (body) of course is illegitimate. Despite the success of science, in this century, we have witnessed a great resurgence of the non-scientific, quietistic and humane qualities of life. On this matter, the East has always been a great resource and inspiration, for some form of meditative discipline permeates the whole Asiatic traditions, e.g., Yoga, Zen and Taoist Quietism. Research in the disciplines should reveal more information concerning the aesthetic dynamics of the differentiated and undifferentiated realms.

Second, there is a need for the understanding of man-nature in a total sense, an understanding that is being undercut by science and materialism. In the East, this understanding is based on a profound organic philosophy that permeates as well as fulfills life, a system of total or grand harmony. Whether it is Taoist naturalism, I-Ching or Hua-yen metaphysics, sams~ ra=nirv~ na or } tman=Brahman, the organic whole is always kept intact. In these metaphysical views, however, one should not succumb to the notion of an Absolute with cosmic dimensions and effect on man but should ever be alert to the mutuality of things and the existentiality of man. To be sure, Eastern systems—Chinese, Buddhist or Indian—are at times vague about the organic nature of man and his surroundings, but this should not deter one from probing into the ever present grand, open and vast natures in the immediacy of things. This of course requires concentrated attention. Maurice Merleu-Ponty’s theory of holistic perception, for example, is a good beginning, Olivier Lacombe has recently asserted the need for an expanded capacity of the intellect to work in symbiosis with the senses, i.e., one "endowed with a capacity of perceiving intuitively meta-empirical being through empirical data, and not merely of dealing rationally with sense material."[57] At any rate, we ought to channel or energies toward an understanding of a holistic nature of experience within the community of things and, paradoxically enough, science may help us along in this effort.

Third, and this is a most difficult area to discuss, we must attempt to understand and implement the unique Eastern concepts of emptiness (k’ung, Ñ ã nyat~ ) and non-being (wu). We have not yet heard the last word on the real nature of either concept, although we are reminded again and again of their valued presence and effects on our ordinary actions. Though both concepts started out differently in Buddhist and Chinese traditions, they have been so well synthesized in China that, generally speaking, they are indistinguishable, but purists of whatever persuasion may take exception to this view. The point, however, is that these concepts are vital components of the aesthetic realm and need to be incorporated properly in man’s experience. Being an organic creature, man is essentially reflexive and this trait may find its source in the dynamic function that involves emptiness or non-being. This needs to be explored further. [58]

Fourth and finally, there is need for a recovery of our moral posture in life, qua man-nature. This is not a discovery of a moral nature or principle, although that might eventually be entertained as an aftermath of the recovery. Moral posture is a difficult matter to discuss because of the stigma attached to anything which has to do with moral or ethical concepts. But ethics has always been central to philosophy in both Eastern and Western traditions. In the East, the Hindu and Buddhist dharma, the Confucian jen and Taoist tao are the pillars around which other lesser principles support and perpetuate their undeclared indistinct values. It is important to recognize that these so-called pillars are basically aesthetic in nature. Here Northrop quickly grasped the opportunity to state that the "good which is identified with the indeterminate, all-embracing factor is the only good which is absolute in the sense that it holds for all people under all circumstances."[59] By contrast, a good identified with the determinate or differentiated is good only on the temporary or relative basis, but clearly ethics or morality cannot be founded on that basis.

There are other areas of contact with the Northropian methodology, but the above four should suffice for the time being. His categories have indeed come a long way and will probably be around for a long time to come. The Northropian challenge, however, is actually on us: Do we ignore the categories or take up the challenge?

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[16] PEW, p. 203.

[46] Herbert Fingarette, Confucius—The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1972).

[58] Here I am immediately reminded of Dr. Thomé H. Fang’s enormous effort in clearly enunciating the nature of a grand harmony existing in the world o fman and nature. In his first major work in English, The Chinese View of Life (Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1956), he gave the finest expression to the philosophy of comprehensive harmony, a philosophy which, admittedly, profoundly influenced the present writer’s view on things Chinese and has been a constant challenge and guide in probing into the subtleties of Chinese thought. In his crowning work, Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 1981), superbly translated by Professor George Sun as 「中國哲學精神及其發展」（zhongguo zhexue jingshen jiqi fazhan), Dr. Fang analyzed how the Chinese spirit of comprehensive harmony permeates Confucian, Taoists, Buddhists and Neo-Confucian systems. Much indeed can be learned from this great work by this most learned and insightful scholar.

[59] Recent studies by Japanese thinkers, e.g., Nishida KitarÇ , A Study of Good, tr. V. H. Viglielmo, Ministry of Education, Japan, 1960; Fundamental Problems of Philsophy, tr. David A. Dilworth and Valdo H. Viglielmo, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973, etc. Nishitani Keiju, Religion and Nothingness, Berkeley: University of California Press. 1982; Abe Masao in Zen and Western Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985) and Matsuo HÇ saku in The Logic of Unity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987) have delved deeply into the philosophic and religious implicatons and dimensions of the concept of emptiness or nothingness (Ñ ã nyat~ ). Their independent but commonly focused studies have automatically brought them into the comparative scene, although the Northropian scheme is yet to be treated systematically.